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COMMENT: SoNY, FAIR USE, AND
FILE SHARING
Stacey L. Dogan
t
Jessica Litman's article does a wonderful job of describing the
method behind Sony's madness.' In this short Commentary, I would
like to explore just one of the interesting strands developed in her
paper-the scope of personal fair use in Sony, and its implications for
peer-to-peer file sharing. More specifically, I want to reflect on the
suggestion that Sony's broad exemption for personal copying has
eroded into something unrecognizable, and that it is this
erosion-rather than any difference between file-sharing and time-
shifting-that explains the courts' hostility to the fair use defense in
the peer-to-peer context.
2
Two of Professor Litman's descriptive claims strike me as undeni-
able. First, fair use analysis since Sony has moved toward a market
failure approach that prefers transformative uses and disfavors pure
copying.3 Second, fair use has played only a background role in the
legal discourse over file sharing.4 And it is certainly plausible to posit
a direct causal relationship between these two facts. But I think it
worth at least pausing to consider an alternative possibility: that
Sony's exemption for noncommercial copying was never categorical,
Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law.
See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917 (2005).
2 Id. at 960.
3 Many have criticized this development. For two excellent recent examples, see gener-
ally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555-60 (2004); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative
Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003).
4 As Professor Litman points out, the Grokster defendants made a strategic decision not
to raise the issue, making fair use technically beyond the scope of the case before the Supreme
Court. Litman, supra note 1, at 957. Cf J. Glynn Lunney, Jr., et al., Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors in Support of Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 380 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-480), available at http://www.eff.orgllIP2PIMGM_v_Grokster/
20050301_lunney.pdf (exhorting Supreme Court to consider fair use issue and contending that
most file sharing constitutes fair use).
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and would not have shielded the vast majority of unauthorized file
sharing at issue in today's peer-to-peer wars. If so, the paradox of
Sony may lie not in the public's continued faith in an obsolete Su-
preme Court decision, but in the dichotomy between the public per-
ception of Sony and the true intentions of the Court.
I. PRIVATE COPIES, PRESUMPTIONS, AND THE SONY MAJORITY
Scholars commonly remember Sony for its presumption of fair use
for noncommercial copying. 5 Both the language of Sony and the de-
liberative process that generated it, however, suggest a rather fragile
presumption whose existence and scope may have depended heavily
on the facts of that case. The decision by no means represented a
wholesale exemption for private copying.
For one thing, as Professor Litman's account makes clear, only
Justice Stevens felt unequivocally that all "private" copying should
fall beyond the scope of copyright law.6 The motivations of Justices
O'Connor and Brennan, in particular, reflected greater nuance and
more ambivalence. O'Connor sided with the majority in large part
because of her reluctance to disturb the district court's conclusion that
the studios would suffer no "actual or potential" harm from VCR
use.7 Had the studios satisfied their burden of proving "potential"
harm to the value of their copyrights, O'Connor would have found
infringement, despite the noncommercial nature of the copying and
the fact that it took place in consumers' homes. Economics, rather
than privacy concerns, drove O'Connor to favor reversal.
The key to the Sony fair use puzzle, then, lies in understanding the
burden-shifting proposed by O'Connor and adopted in the majority
opinion. What kind of evidence from copyright holders could rebut
the fair use presumption and justify a finding of infringement by indi-
viduals engaged in noncommercial use? The answer to this question
requires consideration not only of O'Connor's statements on burden-
shifting, but of the views of the other Justices who joined the majority
opinion, most notably Justice Brennan.
Brennan held fast to a distinction between time-shifting-which he
viewed as fair use-and copying to create video libraries-which he
did not.8 Given the consistency of his position on this point, Brennan
5 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1984); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 313, 331 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony
Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977, 984-85 (2002).
6 See Litman, supra note 1, at 930.
7 fd. at 934.
8 Justices White and Burger apparently shared this view. See id. at 929.
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almost certainly would not have endorsed an opinion that extended
the fair use privilege to those who saved copies to make video librar-
ies. Yet the studios' evidence of the economic effects of "librarying"
was hardly more conclusive than their proof of harm from time-
shifting.9 Brennan's distinction between time-shifting and librarying,
therefore, must have turned on something other than a difference be-
tween the record evidence of accrued harm from the two kinds of use.
Arguably, it turned on an instinct as to the probable long-term impact
of time-shifting as compared to librarying. The studios simply had
not offered a persuasive story in support of the claim that watching a
publicly aired program at a later time would reduce demand for their
copyrighted works. The nexus between copying and reduced de-
mand, however, followed more naturally in the case of video libraries,
which would more likely substitute for television programming.
When we consider O'Connor's presumption in light of Brennan's
distinction between time-shifting and librarying, then, it becomes
clear that rebutting the Sony presumption does not require proof of
actual financial injury from a noncommercial use. It requires, instead,
a persuasive, logical nexus between the copying at issue and the
likely future demand for the copyrighted expression. The language of
the opinion confirms this approach:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that
if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual present
harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage.
Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm
will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of fu-
ture harm exists. 10
The potential harm from the use, of course, encompasses only one
of the four statutory fair use factors. Given the Court's extensive
analysis of the first and fourth factors, it is tempting to overlook the
role of the other factors in Sony, and to assume that they should play
no role in cases involving noncommercial use. Sony itself, however,
turned at least in part on the Court's conclusion that the second and
9 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 467-68 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), aff'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (dismissing
evidence of harm from librarying).
10 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
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third factors should have little bearing in the unique circumstances
presented by that case. In particular, Sony involved a type of
work-off-the-air television broadcasts-that copyright holders had
offered for free to the public, and that that consumers simply wanted
to watch at a more convenient time. The free, broadcast nature of the
television programs led the Court to minimize the significance of
factor two-the expressive nature of the works-and factor
three-the amount of the work copied. It is significant that the Court
deemphasized these factors not because of the noncommercial nature
of the copying, but because of the unrestricted nature of the distribu-
tion of the works by the copyright holders. Presumably, the Court
would not so easily disregard these factors in a case that did not in-
volve public broadcasts.
Of course, the constellation on the Court has changed quite sub-
stantially since Sony, making even the most careful analysis of the
Justices' motivations of limited use in anticipating where this Su-
preme Court would lean today. But both the contingent nature of the
Sony presumption and the fragile nature of the coalition that endorsed
it strike me as important when choosing whether to emphasize simi-
larities or differences between Betamax time-shifters and users of
peer-to-peer networks.
II. TIME SHIFrERS AND FILE SHARERS
Professor Litman's article mentions some of the similarities be-
tween home recorders and peer-to-peer file sharers.1 But there are
important differences as well-differences that, in light of the above
discussion, arguably should matter in evaluating file sharers' fair use
claims.
Nature of the Works. Unlike Sony, works traded on file-sharing
networks are not works being picked up from a public broadcast, for
watching at a later time. Whether or not a particular downloaded file
would substitute for a legally purchased copy, unauthorized
downloads clearly provide users with a permanent copy of content to
which they have no prior entitlement.
Nature and Scale of the Copying. The Sony majority was careful
to limit its fair use ruling to single copies of television programs made
for purposes of time-shifting. Even Justice Stevens, the strongest
proponent of fair use, seemed motivated primarily by a concern to
protect individuals' ability to make single copies for their own per-
sonal use.12 File sharing is different both in nature and in scale.
II See Litman, supra note 1, at 951-52.
12 Id. at 930.
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Unlike a unilateral act of taping a television program, file sharing
involves a global, collaborative copying and distribution process
among individuals who rarely know one another. File sharing, more-
over, usually does not entail the making of single copies. While a
single individual may download only one copy of a particular song,
the scale of the copying and distribution of content on file-sharing
networks simply bears no relation to the isolated acts of off-air taping
that the Court considered in Sony.
Privacy concerns. In Sony, the very detection of the copying
would have required invasion into people's homes. People who trade
music files, however, deliberately reach outside of their homes and
achieve their copying and distribution through a public, global net-
work. This is not to suggest that investigations into individuals' use
of networks do not raise privacy concerns; certainly they do.13 But
the nature of the privacy concern is at least different in the peer-to-
peer context, where investigations can yield preliminary evidence
about file-sharing patterns even before identifying a particular culprit,
let alone physically entering an individual's home.
Potential harm. On the facts of Sony, the Court found that the
plaintiffs had not proven injury because of the implausibility that
time-shifting would harm any identifiable market. People would not
stay away from theaters just because they could now choose when to
watch their favorite television program; perhaps more significantly,
the evidence failed to suggest that the Nielson ratings, the benchmark
tool for setting advertising rates, would ignore home recorders. 14 A
clear majority of the Justices, however, were willing to presume that
economic harm would occur if individuals kept tapes of recorded
programs without erasing them.
The likelihood of harm from widespread, legalized file sharing ap-
pears at least as strong as that from librarying. In particular, at least
some copies distributed through file sharing networks are likely to
substitute for lawfully acquired purchases. While fair use proponents
point to surveys minimizing the economic impact of the file sharing
phenomenon, 5 such an argument misses two points. First, Sony
never required clear evidence of lost profits; the Court insisted only
on a "showing . . .that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
13 In part for this reason, courts have appropriately insisted that copyright holders file law-
suits before they may obtain the identity of individual file-sharers. See, e.g., Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Serv. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
14 In the age of TiVo, it seems quaint that the Justices assumed that time-shifters would
watch all commercials, but they appear to have made exactly that assumption. See Sony, 464
U.S. at 452 n.36, 454-55.
15 E.g., Litman, supra note 1, at 952-53; Lunney, supra note 5, at 1027-29.
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exists."' 6 Second, the surveys study patterns over the past several
years, in which file sharing has come under intense scrutiny and
copyright holders have pursued an aggressive end-user campaign. If
file sharing were declared presumptively fair, it is hard to deny the
"meaningful likelihood" that many music fans would acquire their
music from peer-to-peer networks rather than paying for an author-
ized version.
It may well be that the defendants' reluctance to embrace a fair use
defense in Grokster resulted more from frustration over changes in
the law than from the differences between file sharing and time shift-
ing. Yet it seems equally plausible that those differences make unau-
thorized file sharing a completely different case that would have
failed on fair use even under the majority view(s) in Sony.
16 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
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